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cases.' 3 In other words, the result of the transaction in form looks
like a capital gain while in substance it is not.
A quote from the dissent in the Phillipscase illustrates the need for
a judicial yardstick: "The conclusion which in my opinion cannot be
escaped here might be different where a policy was not about to mature,
or did not have a cash surrender value in an amount close to the full
value at maturity, and where the taxpayer could recover his investment
only through a sale to a third party."'14 The court in Arnjield also
recognized this need when it aptly stated that "the law holds no certainty in this area."'15
Thus by judicial admission a denial of capital gain benefits in this
area is obviously left to a case by case determination, leaving no definite
boundaries set for taxpayer to follow. Since the stakes are often worth
the gambling, taxpayers do invent technical property devices in an effort
to save taxes. Therefore it is urged that legislation be enacted whereby
taxpayer will be accorded identical treatment on the proceeds of the
policy whether they be obtained from a "bona fide sale or exchange" or
surrender to the company. At present this area is merely a trap for the
unwary.
RICHARD B. HART
Torts-Negligence-Automobiles-Owner's
Ignition Key in Lock

Liability After Leaving

The recent case of Williams v. Mickens' presented a question of
first impression in North Carolina. The defendant parked his automobile on a public street with the key in the ignition switch and left
it unattended. The automobile was subsequently stolen, and shortly
thereafter was involved in a collision with the plaintiff caused by the
negligence of the thief. The plaintiff sued defendant for his negligence
in leaving the key in the ignition on the theory that defendant should
have foreseen that a thief might steal the automobile and drive it negligently. Since there was no statute involved, the court decided the case on
common law principles. The trial court granted defendant's motion for
nonsuit and the supreme court affirmed. Relying on the case of Ward
v. Southern Ry.,2 the court said that, while they were not willing to admit
3 Cases cited note 9 supra.

" P-H 1958 T.C. Rep. Dec.

30.87 at 502.
1[9692 at 151.

11 CCH 1958 STAND. FFD. TAX REP.

'247 N.C. 262, 100 S.E.2d 511 (1957).
'206 N.C. 530, 174 S.E. 443 (1934). (Plaintiff was killed when struck by a
piece of coal thrown from defendant's car; held, assuming defendant was negligent
in allowing thieves to be on the train, nevertheless, the plaintiff cannot recover
since the intervening criminal assault was unforeseeable.)
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that defendant's act of leaving the keys in the switch was negligent, even
if such were the case, to allow recovery would do violence to the rule3
of proximate cause as understood and applied in this jurisdiction.
4
Thus the court was reaffrming its position taken in previous cases that
if between the defendant's negligent act and plaintiff's injury, there
is an intervening criminal act by a third person producing the injury,
and such act was not intended by the defendant and could not have
been reasonably foreseen by him, the causal chain between the original
negligence and the accident is broken and the defendant's act of negligence is not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.
Most jurisdictions have refused to hold the car owner liable in "keytheft" cases similar to the principal case. The cases fall into two general
classes: those not involving a statute or ordinance which expressly prohibits the owner or operator of a motor vehicle from leaving his key in
the ignition when the vehicle is left unattended, 5 and those in which
such a statute is involved.
At common law. In a majority of the cases arising in jurisdictions
where there is no applicable statute the plaintiff has been denied recovery
as a matter of law. 6 Various theories for such holdings have been advanced by the courts: (1) the defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff
absent actual knowledge of the presence of thieves or some other circumstance that might reasonably indicate a foreseeable risk of harm to
the plaintiff ;7 (2) leaving the key in the ignition was not a negligent
'Foreseeability of injury is a test of proximate cause. See, e.g., McNair v.
Richardson, 244 N.C. 65, 92 S.E.2d 459 (1956) ; Welling v. Charlotte, 241 N.C.
312, 85 S.E.2d 379 (1955) ; Boone v. North Carolina R.R., 240 N.C. 152, 81 S.E.2d
380 (1954).
'Ward v. Southern Ry., 206 N.C. 530, 174 S.E. 443 (1934); Chancey v. Norfolk
& Western Ry., 174 N.C. 351, 93 S.E. 834 (1917); see also Note, 29 N.C.L. REv.
210 (1951).
An example of such a statute is this District of Columbia traffic regulation:
"Every motor vehicle shall be equipped with a lock to lock the starting lever,
throttle, switch, or gear shift lever, by which the vehicle is set in motion, and no
person shall allow any motor vehicle operated by him to stand unattended on any
street or in any public place without first having locked the lever, throttle, or switch
by which said vehicle may be set in motion." TRAFFIc AND MOTOR VEHIcLE REGULATIONS FOR THE DisRnICr OF COLUMBIA § 58.

A statute of this type has no application when the automobile is parked on
private property or on a private drive. R W. Claxton, Inc., v. Schaff, 169 F.2d 303
(D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 871 (1948).
' Bennett v. Arctic Insulation, Inc., 253 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1958) ; Richards v.
Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954) ; Midkiff v. Watkins, 52 So. 2d 573 (La.
App. 1951); Curtis v. Jacobson, 142 Me. 351, 54 A.2d 520 (1947); Gower v.
Lamb, 282 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. App. 1955); Reti v. Vaniska, Inc., 14 N.J. Super. 94,
81 A.2d 377 (L. 1951) ; Lotito v. Kyriacus, 272 App. Div. 635, 74 N.Y.S.2d 599
(4th Dept. 1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 1027, 80 N.E.2d 542 (1948) ; Wagner v. Arthur,
73 Ohio L. Abs. 16, 134 N.E.2d 409 (1956) ; Teague v. Pritchard, 38 Tenn. App.
686. 279 S.W.2d 706 (1954).
' Bennett v. Arctic Insulation, Inc., supra note 6; Richards v. Stanley, supra
note 6; Gower v. Lamb, supra note 6.
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act;8 (3) assuming the defendant negligent, still the intervening criminal act was sufficient to insulate the defendant's negligence and establish
the intervening cause as the efficient or proximate cause of the accident 0 In at least one jurisdiction it was held that the questions of
negligence and proximate cause should be submitted to the jury, on
the ground that reasonable men might differ under the circumstances
of the case. 10
Violation of a statute. When statutes have been involved in the
"key-theft" cases the courts have been less consistent in their holdings.
Perhaps a majority of the courts have held the defendant car owner
not liable."- In so holding, the courts have said: (1) the purpose of
the statute "was largely for the protection of the car owners themselves and as an aid in proper law enforcement in the discouragement of
theft and pilferage" ;12 (2) the statute expressly stated that it was not
applicable in a civil action;13 (3) even though the defendant was negligent in violating the statute, nevertheless the negligent driving of the
thief was an intervening act whch caused the accident and superseded
the original negligence of the defendant car owner.' 4 On the other
hand, there is a strong minority view to the effect that the violation of
the statute by the defendant warrants the submission of the facts to the
jury.'5 These courts have reasoned that the statute was passed as a
public safety measure, not as a crime deterrent, and its violation is
either treated as prima facie evidence of negligence" or as constituting
negligence per se; 17 in either case the question of proximate cause is
'Midkiff v. Watkins, 52 So. 2d 573 (La. App. 1951).
' Curtis v. Jacobson, 142 Me. 351, 54 A.2d 520 (1947) ; Reti v. Vaniska, Inc., 14
N.J. Super. 94, 81 A.2d 377 (L. 1951) ; Lotito v. Kyriacus, 272 App. Div. 635, 74
N.Y.S.2d 599 (4th Dept. 1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 1027, 80 N.E.2d 542 (1948) ; Wagner v. Arthur, 73 Ohio L. Abs. 16, 134 N.E.2d 409 (1956).
10 R. W. Claxton, Inc., v. Schaff, 169 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. dcnied,
335 U.S. 871 (1948) ; Eesley v. Dottellis, 61 A.2d 564 (D.C. Munic. Ct. 1948) ;
Bullock v. Dahlstrom, 46 A.2d 370 (D.C. Munic. Ct. 1946). (The statute was not
applicable in these cases. See note 5 supra.)
" Frank v. Ralston, 145 F. Supp. 294 (W.D. Ky. 1956) ; Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc.,.
122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E.2d 395 (1952) ; Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255, 81
N.E.2d 560 (1948) ; Anderson v. Theisin, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950);
Permenter v. Milner Chevrolet Co.. 91 So. 2d 243 (Miss. 1956).
" Anderson v. Theisin, 231 Minn. 369, 371, 43 N.W.2d 272, 273 (1950).
13 Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954) ; Gower v. Lamb, 282
S.W.2d 867 (Mo. App. 1955).
"Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc., 122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E.2d 395 (1952) ; Galbraith
v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255, 81 N.E.2d 560 (1948); Permenter v. Milner Chevrolet
Co., 91 So. 2d 243 (Miss. 1956).
'" Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74, 51 A.L.R.2d 624 (1954);
Garbo v. Walker, 57 Ohio Op. 363, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 368, 129 N.E.2d 537 (1955).
10 Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., mpra note 15.
1
Garbo v. Walker, 57 Ohio Op. 363, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 368, 129 N.E.2d 537"
(1955).
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Still a third view is that violation of the statute is a legal
for the jury.'
or proximate cause of the harm as a matter of law and the case should
not go to the jury. 9
The court in the principal case indicates the difficulty that would
arise were the defendant car owner in the "key-theft" cases held liable.
The court said:
If the owner is liable for injury inflicted by the thief at the next
street crossing, there appears no reason why liability should not
extend to the next town, the next county, or the next state. If
leaving the key in the switch creates liability, leaving it on the
seat, or on the owner's desk where a thief could easily find it,
would seem also to imply liability. If liability exists on the day
of the theft, does it not continue to the next day, and the next?.
Surely, ownership of a motor vehicle does not involve such
hazard. 20
Further insight into the "key-theft" cases may be gained by an
appraisal of the risks which the car owner creates by leaving his key
in the ignition. In so doing, he does not assume that it will be driven.
At most he creates the risk that it will be stolen and driven. By comparison, one who lends his car to another obviously knows that his car
will be driven. In the "key-theft" case the risk that the car will be
stolen-and by a thief who is a negligent driver-is materially less than
the risk involved where an owner entrusts his car to another for the
very purpose of being driven. The North Carolina court,, however,
21
has held that a bailor is not liable for a bailee's negligent driving.
There seems to be no logical reason for holding the owner liable in the
"key-theft" cases when by analogy he has created a lesser risk that the
"8 Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74, 51 A.L.R.2d 624 (1954);
Garbo v. Walker, mtpra note 17.
1 Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
790 (1944). The Ross case overruled Squires v. Brooks, 44 App. D.C. 320 (D.C.
Cir. 1916), where the court held, on facts essentially similar and under a similar
ordinance, that the defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury. The District of Columbia, however, has recognized that some
limit must be placed on the car owner's liability. In Howard v. Swagart, 161 F.2d
651 (D.C. Cir. 1947), the thief, some twelve hours after the theft, allowed another
person to borrow the car. This person negligently collided with the plaintiff's car.
The court, holding for the defendant car owner, stated, "It cannot fairly be said
that this court meant, by the Ross and Schaff decisions, to impose liability on the
owner ... of an unlocked car for the negligent action of every person, other than
the thief, driving it subsequent to the theft." Id. at 655. See also Casey v.
Corson and Gruman Co., 221 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955), where the court held that
the defendant's negligence in leaving his car in a private parking lot in the District
of Columbia with the keys in the ignition was too remote in time, place, and
circumstances to have been a proximate cause of a collision taking place in Petersburg, Virginia, in which the plaintiff was injured by the thief's negligent driving
of the defendant's car. (The ordinance was not applicable.)
2 247 N.C. at 263, 100 S.E.2d at 513.
"1Reich v. Cone, 180 N.C. 267, 104 S.E. 530 (1920).
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car will be driven negligently than has a person who lends his car to
another.

22

23
The test of foreseeability has been a big factor in all of these cases.
It is conceded that there may be circumstances which make foreseeable
24
the possibility of harm resulting from leaving keys in a parked car.
However, such circumstances are not usually present. There is usually
no evidence from which a jury could properly infer that the defendant
car owner could foresee that the thief would steal the car and drive
it negligently. 25 It is admitted that by leaving the keys in the ignition
lock of the automobile one increases the risk of theft and that in certain
circumstances this might be held to have been foreseeable as a matter of
law, but can it be said that it is foreseeable that a thief will be negligent ?26 Absent a statute that expressly states that the defendant car
owner in this type case is to be held liable for the thief's negligence or

some special circumstance which would put the owner on notice, there
would seem to be no justification for holding him liable.27
BAILEY PATRICK, JR.
23

Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954).

23 An example of the conflict in the courts as to what is foreseeable is shown

by the following inconsistent statements made by the Illinois appellate courts:
"[The defendant car owner] is required by all rules of common sense and reason
to know that a thief, in his effort to escape from the scene of the theft, may have
no greater regard for traffic lights or traffic regulations than he had for the
criminal statute making it a felony to steal the car." Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 Ill.
App. 359, 368, 77 N.E.2d 537, 541 (1948); "It would seem reasonable that a car
thief, in order to avoid attracting attention and arrest, would be meticulous in
observing traffic laws such as speeding, running stop lights, etc." Cockrell v.
Sullivan, 344 Ill. App. 620, 624, 101 N.E.2d 878, 879 (1951). In Ney v. Yellow
Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74, 51 A.L.R.2d 624 (1954), the Illinois Supreme
Court settled the question by adopting the rule of the Ostergardcase.
"Leaving the automobile illegally parked in such condition as would render it
dangerous to children who are known by the owner to be exposed to the hazard,
Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry, 190 N.C. 649, 130 S.E. 638 (1925) ; leaving an
intoxicated person in an automobile with the keys in the ignition, Morris v. Boiling,
31 Tenn. App. 577, 218 S.W.2d 754 (1948) ; Pfaehler v. Ten Cent Taxi Co., 198
S.C. 476, 18 S.E.2d 331 (1942).
"The New York Appellate Division held in Lotito v. Kyriacus, 272 App. Div.
635, 74 N.Y.S.2d 599 (4th Dept. 1947), that even though car owners, prior to the
theft of defendant's car, had been warned through the newspapers and over the
radio not to leave their cars unlocked or the keys inside the car because of the
commonness of such thefts, still the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff who
had been struck by the defendant's car which was being driven by the thief at the
time.
" Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc., 122 Ind. App. 587, 596, 106 N.E.2d 395, 399 (1952).
"It is our observation that in the absence of clear legislative declaration this result
would not ordinarily be reached except where -the surrounding circumstances clearly
point to both a high probability of intervening crime, and of like pursuant negligent
operation of the vehicle by the thief. We do not presume to affirm or deny that
such circumstances are highly probable in the District of Columbia or the First
District of the Appellate Court of Illinois. We do assert with some satisfaction
that such circumstances are not reasonably foreseeable in this jurisdiction."
" For additional material on this subect see Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 633 (1957)
and 43 CAL L. Rv. 140 (1955).

